Power indices like those of Shapley and Shubik (1954) 
Introduction
Power indices are functions that map n-person simple games, such as weighted multi-party voting games, to n-dimensional real vectors. They assign to each player a number that indicates the player's power to shape events. The power of a dictator is usually scaled to unity and that of null or dummy players, who cannot turn any losing coalition into a winning one, is set to zero. Anonymity, particular monotonicity and aggregation properties for different simple games are additionally required or, at least, desired.
Power indices have been applied to evaluate numerous political and economic institutions. Power distributions in the context of shareholders' meetings have been one focus of attention (compare e. g. Leech 1988) , with the related theoretical challenge of dealing with cross-ownership whereby players exert power both directly and indirectly (see Gambarelli and Owen 1994 for one solution). In the political sphere, decision making in the U.S. Congress, U.S. presidential elections (see Owen 1975) , the U.N. Security Council, and, recently, the institutions of the European Union (e. g. Laruelle and Widgrén 1998 ; see Nurmi 1998 for a comprehensive survey) have all been studied extensively using power indices.
Despite the wide application and almost fifty years after the seminal contribution to power measurement by Shapley and Shubik (1954) , there is still considerable controversy as to what constitutes an appropriate power measure.
1 In the wake of Shapley and Shubik's work, numerous power indices have been proposed and axiomatically characterized -most notably by Banzhaf (1965) , Deegan and Packel (1978) , and Holler and Packel (1983) .
Cf. the contributions in Holler and Owen (2001) , for example.
2 For a recent comparative investigation of power indices, their properties and applicability, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) . , and 1 2 of total power to players B and C.
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In this paper, we define the concept of inferior players as a first step to overcome this deficiency. Based on this definition we suggest to replace the dummy axiom conventionally used in power measurement by a stricter axiom.
The proposed axiom requires indices to not take into account a player's supposed power (as traditionally measured by swings, pivot positions, etc.) if some other player can issue the following ultimatum to him: accept (almost) no share of the spoils from a winning coalition or be prevented from taking part in one at all. Thus, power measurement is brought more in line with competitive analysis.
Section 2 starts with some preliminary definitions. Section 3 introduces the concept of inferior players and proposes the inferior player axiom. The Strict Power Index (SPI), related to the Banzhaf index, is introduced and axiomatized in section 4. Then, section 5 investigates inferiority in the realm of probabilistic power measurement. A probabilistic foundation of the SPI and a more general family of indices is given, before section 6 concludes.
3 Note that successful attempts have been made to provide a non-cooperative foundation for the value concepts related to power indices, most notably the Shapley value (see Hart and Mas-Collel, 1996 , for example). Doubts about the realism of the highly specific bargaining procedures and respective limit considerations are, in our view, confirmed by this simple example.
Preliminary definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. P(N ) = {0, 1} n is the set of feasible coalitions. The simple game v is characterized by the set W (v)
. v can also be described by a characteristic function v : P(N ) → {0, 1} with
G N denotes the set of all such n-person simple games. Voting games are special instances of simple games that are characterized by a non-negative real vector r v = (q; w 1 , . . . , w n ), where w i represents player i's voting weight and q represents the quota of votes that establishes a winning coalition.
A player who by leaving a winning coalition S ∈ W (v) turns it into a losing coalition S \ {i} / ∈ W (v) has a swing in S, and is called a crucial member of coalition S. Coalitions where player i has a swing are called crucial coalitions with respect to i. Let
the set of minimal winning coalitions (MWC). The number of swings of player i will be denoted by
A player i with η i (v) = 0 is called a dummy player.
A power index is a mapping µ : G N → R n + , assigning to each player i ∈ N a number µ i (v) that indicates i's power in the considered game v.
Typically, one scales µ such that µ i (v) = 1 if and only if i is a dictator in v, i. e. M (v) = {{i}}. Moreover, it is required that µ i (v) = 0 if i is a dummy player. A prominent example, the non-normalized Banzhaf index (BZI) β, is defined by
Since there are 2 n−1 coalitions in which i could have a swing, β i (v) represents i's ratio of actual to potential number of swings.
An index µ is anonymous if µ π(i) (πv) = µ i (v) holds for any permutation π of the set N of players, where πv is defined by (πv)(S) :
is locally monotonic on the domain of voting games if w i ≥ w j in r v implies 
Provided that an index is anonymous, global monotonicity implies
4 Weighted values serve as an example where anonymity is relaxed (see Kalai and Samet 1988 for details). A recent related study is Haimanko (2000) .
local monotonicity (Levínský and Silárszky 2001) . SSI and BZI are globally monotonic, the normalized BZI is not.
Power in simple games can also be analysed in a probabilistic setting.
Instead of deterministic coalitions S ⊆ N , corresponding to corner points s ∈ {0, 1} n of the n-dimensional unit cube, one considers fuzzy or random coalitions S represented by points p ∈ [0, 1] n anywhere in the cube. Each
is interpreted as the probability of player i ∈ N deciding in favour of a random proposal or of participating in a randomly formed coalition. We refer to p i as player i's acceptance rate.
Players' acceptance decisions are assumed to be independent. Thus, the probability of forming a given coalition S ⊆ N is Pr(
n → {0, 1} of a simple game can then be extended by weighting v(S) for all coalitions S ⊆ N with their respective probability of formation. We get the multilinear extension (MLE)
For fixed acceptance rates (p 1 , . . . , p n ), the MLE gives the probability of formation of a winning coalition in v, and also the expected value of v. Note that players' acceptance rates may not be constants, but random variables themselves.
Let f i denote the partial derivative ∂f /∂p i of v's MLE with respect to p i . It is usually referred to as player i's power polynomial (Straffin 1988) .
. . , p n ) is the probability of i having a swing in the random coalition to be formed in game v. When players' acceptance rates (p 1 , . . . , p n ) are themselves random variables with a joint distribution P , the expectation
is an indicator of i's power in game v. The probabilistic power index defined by (1) coincides with traditional deterministic indices for several plausible probability models. When all players' acceptance rates are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] -in short notation: ∀i ∈ N : (1) equals the BZI. winning. In this sense, B is an inferior player in game v. Formalizing this intuitive notion of inferiority, we state:
There is a neat equivalent definition:
Proof: a) Let i be inferior in v. Assume that there existsS ∈ C i (v) with
b) S ∈ C j (v) implies j ∈ S -establishing the first part of definition 1.
Using the argument in a), the latter implies
. This is a contradiction.
Any dummy player is inferior. The reverse is true for strong or decisive simple games where ∀S ⊆ N : Players who are not inferior are generally agreed to be powerful. The conventional notion of powerless players embodied in the dummy player axiom -requiring that an index µ gives zero power to dummy players -is a quite weak one, however. In our view, it is too weak for a relevant class of circumstances that are modelled by simple games -in particular, if there is scope for negotiation before coalition formation and there are at most finitely many decisions to be taken. Under these circumstances, an inferior player i is subject to aforementioned credible ultimatum threats by some player j. The power usually associated with the swings that an inferior player may have is obliterated, and an inferior player can be expected to have only marginal influence on any economic or political decision. Therefore, we suggest to strengthen the conventional dummy player axiom:
As illustrated in the introduction, none of the conventional power indices satisfies the inferior player axiom.
The Strict Power Index (SPI)
In order to show that the inferior player axiom leads to reasonable power indices with desirable properties and plausible probability models, we will define an example index related to the BZI. This is based on the traditional deterministic formulation of power indices. Note that similar adaptations could be made to the SSI, the Deegan-Packel index, or other power indices.
We start with the following adaptation of the notion of swings:
Definition 2: Player i has a strict swing in winning coalition S ∈ W (v) if a) i can turn S into a losing coalition by leaving it, and b) i is not inferior in v, i. e. i / ∈ I(v).
denote the number of strict swings of player i in game v. Substituting strict swings for swings in the definition of the BZI, we get the following new power index: ). C is part of smaller MWC than E. This yields a greater number of swings so that greater power is indicated by the BZI. However, C's supposed power is obliterated by his dependence on A. So, E has more strict swings that actually translate into power. Corresponding with the BZI, we have the following result:
Proposition 2: The SPI is globally monotonic.
Proof: Consider arbitrary simple games u, v ∈ G N with u i v. We need to show that σ i (u) ≥ σ i (v). If i is inferior in v, this is trivial. The global monotonicity of the BZI implies σ i (u) ≥ σ i (v) if i is not inferior in u. It remains to confirm that i cannot be inferior in u without being inferior in v.
It can be checked that
. Player i keeps his swings in all coalitions S ∈ C i (v) in game u. If either j has additional swings in u only together with i, or if there is a new coalition S ∈ C i (u) with j / ∈ S, we are finished. Otherwise, for i to become inferior in u, it must be true that a) j is part of all S ∈ C i (u) and that b) there is a coalitionŜ ∈ C j (u) with i / ∈Ŝ.
. Now, we either haveŜ ∈ C j (v), which contradicts
. SinceŜ \ {j} ∪ {i} wins in v, it also wins in u. Player i cannot be crucial inŜ \ {j} ∪ {i} because that would contradict a). So,Ŝ \ {j} ∈ W (u), contradicting b).
It facilitates comparisons with other power measures if an index is fully
characterized by a set of logically independent axioms. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the SPI along the same route which Dubey and Shapley (1979) The strategic considerations underlying the inferior player axiom imply that power is generally non-linear. We therefore use a less restrictive requirement than additivity for the characterization of the SPI.
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Proposition 3: The SPI is the unique power index satisfying the following four independent axioms:
Proof: A1 and A2 are satisfied by construction. A3 follows from the anonymity of swings, and hence of strict swings. A4 refers to non-inferior players only. For those players, the SPI is constructed to coincide with the BZI. By complete induction, we prove a lemma claiming that A4 is satisfied by any index µ which satisfies additivity, in particular the BZI: Consider an arbitrary game w r ∈ G N with exactly r ≥ 1 MWC, i. e. M (w r ) = {S 1 , . . . , S r }.
The claim is obviously true for r = 1. We proceed to r + 1 and consider
. . , S r , S r+1 }. Using additivity and the result for r, µ i (w r+1 ) equals
(2)
To this, the result for r can be applied once more:
Substituting this in (2) proves the claim for r + 1, and thus the lemma.
Next, we prove that A1-A4 uniquely define a function µ : G N → R n + . We first consider games with a single minimal winning coalition S ⊆ N , i. e. the auxiliary game u S . All players i / ∈ S are inferior in u S and hence by A1 µ i (u S ) = 0. All non-inferior players j ∈ S by A3 have the same power µ j (u S ) = a with a ≥ 0. Thus, we have
Thus, µ is uniquely defined for all auxiliary games u S with S ⊆ N . A1 and A4 extend this definition to the entire domain G N . ).
Inferior players in a probabilistic setting
In the probabilistic setting, the property of i ∈ I(v) being an inferior player has to be reflected in some way by i's acceptance rate p i . We can find a plausible restriction on p i by recalling that inferior players have to content themselves with essentially a zero share of economic or political spoils when belonging to a winning coalition. This means that an inferior player is basically indifferent between joining a winning coalition or staying outside, between voting for or against a proposal. This can be formalized by:
One gets the following probabilistic foundation of the SPI:
Proposition 4: Applying the SPC in the setting of the probabilistic BZI, i. e.
implies the probabilistic SPI.
The proposition follows from the more general proposition 5 below (c =
2
). Note that imposition of the SPC changes the interpretation of power polynomial f i (p 1 , . . . , p n ). It no longer gives the probability of player i having a swing or being crucial in the random coalition that is to be formed, but the probability of player i having a strict swing or of being crucial in a way that actually permits exertion of power.
Inferior players' practical indifference towards being part of a winning coalition can, of course, be formalized differently. For example, one could assume that inferior players join whatever coalition is decided on by the powerful players of the game with probability one, or probability zero, or some probability c in between. This leads to the 
denote the number of θ-swings of player i in game v. We trivially have
Various indices can be defined based on the primitive θ-swing. Averaging . The special case of c = 1 corresponds to the Follower-Leader Index of Power (FLIP) defined in Napel and Widgrén (2000) . 8 The FLIP is suited to environments in which inferior players are so benign that they always follow the leaders of the game into whatever coalition the latter want to establish.
Conclusion
In this paper we argue in favour of strengthening the commonly used dummy player axiom of power measurement to an axiom based on the concept of inferior players. Motivation for this is the discrepancy between power indications given by, on the one hand, established indices that are based on the dummy player axiom and, on the other hand, an important aspect of power related to competitive equilibrium and core analysis.
In order to demonstrate that meaningful indices which comply with the inferior player axiom can be constructed, we proposed the Strict Power Index (SPI). It was first analyzed in a traditional deterministic setting and axiomatized. For a comprehensive understanding of the concept of inferior players we then investigated its probabilistic counterpart; a probabilistic condition that implies the SPI was derived, and generalized.
Future research may apply the inferior player axiom to other indices than the non-normalized Banzhaf index, e. g. those of Shapley and Shubik or of Deegan and Packel. It could be worthwhile to investigate more thoroughly the mathematical properties of the respective adaptations of the Banzhaf, 8 The requirement p i ≡ 1 for i ∈ I(v) can be weakened to the restriction that p i p j = p j if i is inferior to j in v. This asks for a stronger type of behavioural similarity than the full correlation assumption of the SSI, where inferior players follow the common standard t rather than other players j.
Shapley-Shubik or Deegan-Packel index in terms of axiomatization, monotonicity, and susceptibility to typical paradoxes in power measurement. The inferior player axiom could be extended to the domain of general games in characteristic function form. One may also define a stability concept for coalition structures, i. e. partitions of the set of players, requiring that no element is inferior in the reduced game among coalitions. For example, the stable structures in v 1 are {A, BC} and {ABC}. The relations to the traditional stability notions are yet unexplored.
